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Abstract. From 14/10/2007 to 19/10/2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07421
Formal Protocol Veriﬁcation Applied was held in the International Con-
ference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the sem-
inar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing
work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations
given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas
are put together in this paper. The ﬁrst section describes the seminar
topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers
are provided, if available.
Keywords. Security protocols, formal veriﬁcation, trusted computing,
biometrics, security of mobile computing, electronic voting, payment sys-
tems
07421 Executive Summary  Formal Protocol Veriﬁcation
Applied
Security protocols are a core part of distributed computing systems, and are part
of our everyday life since they are used in web servers, email, mobile phones,
bank transactions, etc. However, security protocols are notoriously diﬃcult to
get right. There are many cases of protocols which are proposed and considered
secure for many years, but later found to have security ﬂaws. Formal meth-
ods oﬀer a promising way for automated security analysis of protocols. While
there have been considerable advances in this area, most techniques have only
been applied to academic case studies and security properties such as secrecy
and authentication. The seminar brought together researchers deploying security
protocols in new application areas, cryptographers, and researchers from formal
methods who analyse security protocols. The interaction between researchers
from these diﬀerent communities aims to open new research topics, e.g., iden-
tify new security properties that need veriﬁcation and reﬁne abstractions of the
abstract models of crytpographic primitives.
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Secure Group Key Exchange
Frederik Armknecht (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, D)
This talk is on some of our recent work on group key exchange (GKE) protocols.
After an introduction into the subject of GKE protocols, our recently proposed
GKE protocol is described. The protocol requires two broadcast rounds and is
provably secure within the universal composability (UC) framework. The second
property ensures that the protocol can be securely combined with other protocols
secure within the UC framework. Moreover, it can be shown that any UC-secure
GKE protocol requires at least two communication rounds, that is, our protocol
is optimal in that sense.
The talk concludes by discussing some unsolved problems and pointing out
future work.
Verifying Implementations of the Information Card
Federated Identity-Management Protocol
Karthik Bhargavan (Microsoft Research UK - Cambridge, GB)
I will describe reference implementations for selected conﬁgurations of the card-
based user authentication protocol ("InfoCard") implemented within Windows
Vista. I will show how we prove authentication and privacy properties of these
protocol implementations using our tool FS2PV, relying on the theorem prover
ProVerif.
Keywords: Protocol veriﬁcation, veriﬁed implementations, federated identity
management
Joint work of: Bhargavan, Karthik; Fournet, Cedric; Gordon, Andy; Swamy,
Nikhil
CryptoVerif: A Computationally Sound Mechanized
Prover for Cryptographic Protocols
Bruno Blanchet (Ecole Normale Supérieure - Paris, F)
We present CryptoVerif, a mechanized prover for secrecy and correspondence
properties of security protocols.
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In contrast to most previous provers, CryptoVerif does not rely on the Dolev-
Yao model, but on the computational model. It produces proofs presented as
sequences of games, as used by cryptographers; these games are formalized in a
probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus.
CryptoVerif provides a generic method for specifying security assumptions on
cryptographic primitives, which can handle shared-key and public-key encryp-
tion, signatures, message authentication codes, and hash functions. It produces
proofs valid for a number of sessions polynomial in the security parameter, in
the presence of an active adversary.




See also: Bruno Blanchet. A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for
Security Protocols. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 140-
154, Oakland, California, May 2006.
Modular Preservation of Safety Properties by
Cookie-Based DoS-Protection Wrappers
Rohit Chadha (Univ. of Illinois - Urbana, USA)
Current research on verifying security properties of communication protocols
has focused on proving integrity and conﬁdentiality using models that include
a strong Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) threat. By contrast, protection measures
against Denial-of-Service (DoS) must assume a weaker model in which an adver-
sary has only limited ability to interfere with network communications. In this
paper we demonstrate a modular reasoning framework in which a protocol that
satisﬁes certain security properties can be assured to retain these properties after
it is wrapped in a protocol that adds DoS protection. This modular wrapping
is based on the onion skin" model of actor reﬂection. In particular, we show
how a common DoS protection mechanism based on cookies can be applied to
a protocol while provably preserving safety properties (including conﬁdentiality
and integrity) that it was shown to have in an MitM threat model.
Joint work of: Chadha, Rohit; Gunter Carl A.; Meseguer, Jose; Shankesi,
Ravinder; Viswanathan, Mahesh
Making Random Choices Invisible to the Scheduler
Kostas Chatzikokolakis (Ecole Polytechnique - Palaiseau, F)
When dealing with process calculi and automata which express both nondeter-
ministic and probabilistic behavior, it is customary to introduce the notion of
scheduler to resolve the nondeterminism.
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It has been observed that for certain applications, notably those in security,
the scheduler needs to be restricted so not to reveal the outcome of the protocol's
random choices, or otherwise the model of adversary would be too strong even
for obviously correct protocols. In this talk I present a process-algebraic frame-
work in which the control on the scheduler can be speciﬁed in syntactic terms,
and I show how to apply it to solve the problem mentioned above. I also consider
the deﬁnition of (probabilistic) may and must preorders, and show that they are
precongruences with respect to the restricted schedulers. Furthermore, I show
that all the operators of the language, except replication, distribute over prob-
abilistic summation, which is a useful property for veriﬁcation. This framework
is applied to the dining cryptographers problem, where the scheduler problem
comes into play.
Joint work of: Chatzikokolakis, Kostas; Palamidessi, Catuscia
Full Paper:
http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/∼catuscia/papers/Scheduler/report.pdf
Simpliﬁed Security Notions of Direct Anonymous
Attestation
Liqun Chen (HP Lab - Bristol, GB)
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a special signature scheme that enables
remote authentication of a user while preserving privacy under the user's control.
In this talk, a new formal speciﬁcation and security model of DAA will be
introduced.
It is intended to address the same concept of a DAA scheme and to cover the
same security properties that the DAA scheme should hold, as introduced by
Brickell, Camenisch and Chen in ACMCCS 2004. However, hopefully, this new
interpretation would be easier to read than the relative content in the original
DAA paper, and would be helpful for readers to understand and accept the
concept of DAA and its security properties.
The security model of a DAA scheme is speciﬁed with two new security
notions, namely user-controlled-anonymity and user-controlled-traceability. The
talk will focus on the formal deﬁnition of the two notions, and will also compare
them with the full-anonymity and full-traceability notions of group signatures,
as deﬁned by Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi in EUROCRYPT 2003.
As a case study, the talk will brieﬂy cover the security proof of a new DAA
scheme from bilinear maps. The scheme makes use of the Camenisch and Lysyan-
skaya pairing-based signature scheme.
This talk is based on the results of a joint work with Ernie Brickell and
Jiangtao Li.
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Soundness of symbolic equivalence
Hubert Comon-Lundh (AIST - Tokyo, J)
We revisit some of the soundness/completeness results of abstract cryptography,
after deﬁning a general notion of symbolic equivalence.
We emphasize some pending questions, which may be subject to discussion.
Keywords: Security protocols, cryptography
Secure Implementations for Typed Session Abstractions :
Secrecy and Integrity
Ricardo Corin (INRIA-MSR - Orsay, F)
I will present ongoing work on compiling high level session types speciﬁcations
into secure cryptographic protocols.
Complete Characterization of Security Protocols by
Pattern Reﬁnement
Cas Cremers (ETH Zürich, CH)
Recently, the notion of complete characterizations of security protocols was in-
troduced by Guttman and Thayer. We provide an alternative deﬁnition of this
concept, and extend an existing protocol veriﬁcation tool (Scyther) to compute
our notion of complete characterization.
We present both notions of complete characterization, discuss their relative
merits, and provide preliminary empirical results using an extended version of
the Scyther tool.
Keywords: Security protocols, formal analysis, veriﬁcation tools
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1417
Secure Pairing with Biometrics: the SAfE protocol
Sandro Etalle (University of Twente, NL)
Alice and Bob want to exchange a secret, but all the knowledge they have of each
other is a vague picture (no public keys). They have found a protocol based on
fuzzy extractors they believe secure. But will the protocol withstand Dagstuhl
veriﬁcation? And how do you verify a protocol that uses guessing and fuzzy
extractors?
6 L. Chen, S. Kremer and M. D. Ryan
Keywords: Authentication, biometrics, secure pairing




Cryptographically Sound Implementations for Typed
Information-Flow Security
Cédric Fournet (Microsoft Research UK - Cambridge, GB)
In language-based security, conﬁdentiality and integrity policies conveniently
specify the permitted ﬂows of information between diﬀerent parts of a program
with diverse levels of trust.
These policies enable a simple treatment of security, and they can often
be veriﬁed by typing. However, their enforcement in concrete systems involves
delicate compilation issues.
We consider cryptographic enforcement mechanisms for imperative programs
with untrusted components.
Such programs may represent, for instance, distributed systems connected
by some untrusted network.
In source programs, security depends on an abstract information-ﬂow policy
for accessing the shared memory.
In their implementations, shared memory is unprotected and security de-
pends instead on encryption and signing.
We build a translation from well-typed source programs and policies to cryp-
tographic implementations. To establish its correctness, we develop a crypto-
graphic type system for a target probabilistic language. Our typing rules enforce
the correct usage of cryptographic primitives against active adversaries; from an
information-ﬂow viewpoint, they capture controlled forms of robust declassiﬁca-
tion and endorsement.
We show type soundness for a variant of the non-interference property, then
show that our translation preserves typability.
We rely on concrete primitives and hypotheses for cryptography, stated in
terms of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms and games. We model these
primitives as commands in our target language.
Thus, we develop a uniform language-based model of security, ranging from
computational non-interference for probabilistic programs down to standard
cryptographic hypotheses.
Joint work of: Fournet, Cédric; Rezk, Tamara
Full Paper:
http://www.msr-inria.inria.fr/projects/sec/cﬂow
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Security Types for Implementations of Cryptographic
Protocols
Andrew Gordon (Microsoft Research UK - Cambridge, GB)
We implement a logic-based type checker to support veriﬁcation of security pro-
tocols and authorization decisions expressed as executable ML programs.
Joint work of: Bengtson, Jesper; Bhargavan, Karthikeyan; Fournet, Cédric;
Gordon, Andrew; Maﬀeis, Sergio
FT Electronic Purse, a small but challenging protocol
Francis Klay (France Telecom - Lannion, F)
In this talk we present partial results and perspectives for an electronic purse
protocol issued from France Telecom. The goal was to prove that the protocol is
secure or that there is an attack. Modeling this protocol requires algebraic prop-
erties of a fragment of arithmetic, typically containing modular exponentiation.
The usual equational theories described in papers on security protocols are too
weak: this small and simple protocol cannot even be executed in these models.
Keywords: Cryptographic protocols, veriﬁcation, electronic purse
Composition of Password-based Protocols
Steve Kremer (ENS - Cachan, F)
We investigate the composition of protocols that share a common secret. This
situation arises when users employ the same password on diﬀerent services. More
precisely we study whether resistance against guessing attacks composes when
a same password is used. We model guessing attacks using a common deﬁni-
tion based on static equivalence in a cryptographic process calculus close to the
applied pi calculus. We show that resistance against guessing attacks composes
in the presence of a passive attacker. However, composition does not preserve
resistance against guessing attacks for an active attacker. We therefore propose
a simple syntactic criterion under which we show this composition to hold. Fi-
nally, we present a protocol transformation that ensures this syntactic criterion
and preserves resistance against guessing attacks.
Cryptographic and Formal Analysis of Contract Signing
Protocols
Ralf Küsters (ETH Zürich, CH)
Some cryptographic tasks, such as contract signing and other related tasks, need
to ensure complex, branching time security properties.
8 L. Chen, S. Kremer and M. D. Ryan
When deﬁning such properties one needs to deal with subtle problems re-
garding the scheduling of non-deterministic decisions, the delivery of messages
sent on resilient (non-adversarially controlled) channels, fair executions (execu-
tions where no party, both honest and dishonest, is unreasonably precluded to
perform its actions), and deﬁning strategies of adversaries against all possible
non-deterministic choices of parties and arbitrary delivery of messages via re-
silient channels. Unlike formal models, these problems are typically not, or not
all, addressed in cryptographic models and these models therefore do not suﬃce
to formalize branching time properties, such as those required of contract signing
protocols.
In this talk, a cryptographic model that deals with all of the above problems
is proposed. One central feature of this model is a general deﬁnition of fair
scheduling which not only formalizes fair scheduling of resilient channels but
also fair scheduling of actions of honest and dishonest principals. Based on this
model and the notion of fair scheduling, a deﬁnition of a prominent branching
time property of contract signing protocols, namely balance, is provided, along
with the ﬁrst cryptographic proof that the Asokan-Shoup-Waidner two-party
contract signing protocol is balanced. In the talk, recent work on the formal
analysis of contract signing and related protocols in a Dolev-Yao style model
will also be discussed.
The talk is based on the following publications: ESORICS 2007 (with Veronique
Cortier and Bogdan Warinschi), ICALP 2006 (with Detlef Kaehler and Thomas
Wilke), and LICS 2007 (with Detlef Kaehler and Tomasz Truderung).
A Federated Unsplittable Privacy-Protecting
Multi-Coupon Scheme
Hans Löhr (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, D)
A multi-coupon represents a collection of k coupons that a user can redeem
to a vendor in exchange for some goods or services. In FC 2007, a privacy-
protecting multicoupon scheme with protection against splitting was presented.
However, in this scheme, the coupons in a multi-coupon have to be redeemed
in a sequential order that has to be ﬁxed when the multi-coupon is issued. This
imposes limitations on the use of the multi-coupon scheme when diﬀerent types
of coupons are used in one multi-coupon.
In this paper, we overcome this limitation and propose a scheme where the
coupons can be redeemed in an arbitrary order. The communication and com-
putation complexity of issuing a multi-coupon is O(k), the complexity for re-
deeming a single coupon is constant. If diﬀerent types of coupons do not have to
be supported, the complexity of issuing could be reduced to O(log k). Moreover,
we generalize the scheme to support a federation of vendors, which requires a
generalized formal framework, new security requirements and proofs.
Keywords: Coupon, privacy, unsplittability, unlinkability, loyalty, federation
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Zero-Knowledge in the Applied Pi-calculus and Automated
Veriﬁcation of the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol
Matteo Maﬀei (Saarland University, D)
We devise an abstraction of zero-knowledge protocols that is accessible to a fully
mechanized analysis. The abstraction is formalized within the applied pi-calculus
using a novel equational theory that abstractly characterizes the cryptographic
semantics of zero-knowledge proofs. We present an encoding from the equational
theory into a convergent rewriting system that is suitable for the automated
protocol veriﬁer ProVerif. The encoding is sound and fully automated. We suc-
cessfully used ProVerif to obtain the ﬁrst mechanized analysis of the Direct
Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol. The analysis in particular required us
to devise novel abstractions of sophisticated cryptographic security deﬁnitions
based on interactive games.
Keywords: Language-based security, zero-knowledge proofs, applied pi-calculus,
direct anonymous attestation
Joint work of: Backes, Michael; Maﬀei, Matteo; Unruh, Dominique
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1415
OFMC: Models and Methods for the Automated Analysis
of Security Protocols
Sebastian Mödersheim (IBM Research - Zürich, CH)
OFMC (On-the-Fly Model-Checker for Security Protocols) is one of the analysis
tools of the AVISPA toolset. The talk will focus on the two most recent extensions
of OFMC. The ﬁrst is the integration of algebraic reasoning in a generic way,
namely that the user can specify an algebraic theory as part of the problem
to check; we will discuss what restrictions are necessary for decidability. The
second is the integration of techniques based on over-approximation and abstract
interpretation. These techniques can help to overcome the bound to a ﬁnite
number of sessions in the veriﬁcation, and also may speed up veriﬁcation. We give
a formal comparison of several models at diﬀerent levels of over-approximation,
and show that the reasoning is sound for secrecy and a certain speciﬁcation of
authentication goals.
Formal approaches to Information-hiding - An overview -
Catuscia Palamidessi (Ecole Polytechnique - Palaiseau, F)
We give an overview of various formal approaches from literature to information-
hiding: The possibilistic approaches, the probabilistic approaches, the information-
theoretic approaches, and the one based on statistical inference.
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We compare the various frameworks and point out the relations. Finally, we
show how to specify information-hiding protocols and verify them (in the various
approaches) using language-based techniques.





Provable security - an introduction
Kenny Paterson (Royal Holloway Univ. - London, GB)
In this talk, I will give a general introduction to provable security, with an
emphasis on:
* the basic formalism of the approach,
* the scope of its application, and
* its strengths and weaknesses.
Keywords: Provable security
Towards Characterising Observational Equivalence in the
Applied Pi-Calculus
Eike Ritter (University of Birmingham, GB)
Proverif does not always allow automatic veriﬁcation of static equivalence in the
Applied Pi-calculus. In this talk I present characterisations of static equivalence
for a class of substitutions and establish some compositionality results.
Security evaluation of scenarios based on the TCG's TPM
Speciﬁcation
Carsten Rudolph (Fraunhofer SIT - Darmstadt, D)
The Trusted Platform Module TPM is a basic but nevertheless very complex
security component that can provide the foundations and the root of security
for a variety of applications. In contrast to the TPM, other basic security mech-
anisms like cryptographic algorithms or security protocols have been subject to
thorough security analysis and formal veriﬁcation. This paper presents a ﬁrst
methodic security analysis of a large part of the TPM speciﬁcation. A formal
automata model based on asynchronous product automata APA and a ﬁnite
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state veriﬁcation tool SHVT are used to emulate a TPM within an executable
model. On this basis four diﬀerent generic scenarios were analysed with respect
to security and practicability: secure boot, secure storage, remote attestation and
data migration. A variety of security problems and inconsistencies was adapted
to overecome the problems identiﬁed. In this paper, the analysis of the remote
attestation scenario and some of the problems found are explained in more detail.
Joint work of: Gürdens, Sigrid; Rudolph, Carsten; Scheuermann, Dirk; Atts,
Marion; Plaga, Rainer
Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting
protocols
Mark D. Ryan (University of Birmingham, GB)
Electronic voting promises the possibility of a convenient, eﬃcient and secure
facility for recording and tallying votes in an election. Recently highlighted inad-
equacies of implemented systems have demonstrated the importance of formally
verifying the underlying voting protocols. We study three privacy-type prop-
erties of electronic voting protocols: in increasing order of strength, they are
vote-privacy, receipt-freeness, and coercion-resistance.
We use the applied pi calculus, a formalism well adapted to modelling such
protocols, which has the advantages of being based on well-understood concepts.
The privacy-type properties are expressed using observational equivalence
and we show in accordance with intuition that coercion-resistance implies receipt-
freeness, which implies vote-privacy.
We illustrate our deﬁnitions on three electronic voting protocols from the
literature. Ideally, these three properties should hold even if the election oﬃcials
are corrupt. However, protocols that were designed to satisfy receipt-freeness
or coercion-resistance may not do so in the presence of corrupt oﬃcials. Our
model and deﬁnitions allow us to specify and easily change which authorities are
supposed to be trustworthy.
Keywords: Electronic voting, vote privacy, coercion resistance, property veriﬁ-
cation
Joint work of: Delaune, Stephanie; Kremer, Steve; Ryan, Mark D.
Full Paper:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/∼mdr/research/papers/index.html
See also: To appear in Journal of Computer Security. Expected 2008.
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Security Protocols on Trusted Platforms: Tutorial
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, D)
The advent of e-commerce, e-government, and the rapid expansion of world-wide
connectivity demands end-user systems that adhere to well-deﬁned security poli-
cies. In this context Trusted Computing (TC) aims at providing a framework
and eﬀective mechanisms that allow computing platforms and processes in a dis-
tributed IT system to ain assurance about each other's integrity/trustworthiness.
An industrial attempt towards realization of TC is the initiative of the Trusted
Computing Group (TCG), an alliance of a large number of IT enterprises. The
TCG has published a set of speciﬁcations for extending conventional computer
architectures with a variety of security-related features and cryptographic mech-
anisms. The TCG approach has not only been subject of research but also pub-
lic debates and concerns. Currently, several prominent academic and industrial
research projects are investigating trustworthy IT systems based on TC, virtu-
alization technology, and secure operating system design.
In this tutorial we highlight some special aspects of Trusted Computing and
give a short overview of the TCG approach and associated shortcomings and
present some current research challenges.
Automatic veriﬁcation of privacy properties in the applied
pi calculus
Ben Smyth (University of Birmingham, GB)
Abstract: We develop a formal method veriﬁcation technique for cryptographic
protocols. We focus on proving equivalences of the kind P Q, where the processes
P and Q have the same structure and diﬀer only in the choice of terms. The
calculus of ProVerif, a variant of the applied pi calculus, makes some progress
in this direction. We expand the scope of ProVerif, to provide reasoning about
further equivalences. We also provide an extension which allows modelling of
protocols which require global synchronisation. Finally we develop an algorithm
to enable automated reasoning. We demonstrate the practicality of our work
with two case studies.
Keywords: Security, formal veriﬁcation, automated veriﬁcation, equivalence,
ProVerif, applied pi calculus.
Computationally Sound Mechanized Proofs of Basic and
Public-key Kerberos
Joe-Kai Tsay (University of Pennsylvania, USA)
In this talk, we present a computationally sound mechanized analysis of Ker-
beros 5, both with and without its public-key extension PKINIT.
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We prove authentication and key secrecy properties using the prover Cryp-
toVerif, which works directly in the computational model; these are the ﬁrst
mechanical proofs of a full industrial protocol at the computational level. We
also generalize the notion of key usability and use CryptoVerif to prove that this
deﬁnition is satisﬁed by keys in Kerberos.
Towards an Automatic Analysis of Web Services Security
Laurent Vigneron (LORIA & Nancy University, F)
Web services send and receive messages in XML syntax with some parts hashed,
encrypted or signed, according to the WS-Security standard. In this paper we
introduce a model to formally describe the protocols that underly these ser-
vices, their security properties and the rewriting attacks they might be subject
to. Unlike other protocol models (in symbolic analysis) ours can handle non-
deterministic receive/send actions and unordered sequence of XML nodes. Then
to detect the attacks we have to consider the services as combining multiset oper-
ators and cryptographic ones and we have to solve speciﬁc satisﬁability problems
in the combined theory. By non-trivial extension of the combination techniques
of [3] we obtain a decision procedure for insecurity of Web services with messages
built using encryption, signature, and other cryptographic primitives. This com-
bination technique allows one to decide insecurity in a modular way by reducing
the associated constraint solving problems to problems in simpler theories.
Keywords: Security, web services, veriﬁcation, cryptographic protocols, com-
bination of decision procedures, equational theories, rewriting
See also: Yannick Chevalier, Denis Lugiez, and Michaël Rusinowitch. Towards
an Automatic Analysis of Web Service Security. In Franck Wolter, editor, Pro-
ceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Frontiers of Combining Systems
(FroCoS'07), volume 4720 of Lecture Notes in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, pages 133-
147, Liverpool, UK, September 2007. Springer.
